報(bào)告人：倪驍然
時(shí) 間：2022年6月2日下午2:00
方 式：騰訊會議線上研討會
會議號：636 744 215
會議密碼：261399
【報(bào)告人簡介】
倪驍然，廈門大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院、王亞南經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院副教授、博士生導(dǎo)師。主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)楣窘鹑?，?dāng)前研究專長主要包括：企業(yè)利益相關(guān)者與政策評估；制度變遷與企業(yè)發(fā)展；企業(yè)信息環(huán)境。在《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》、《管理世界》、《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（季刊）》、《金融研究》、《中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)》、Journal of Corporate Finance、Journal of Banking and Finance等國內(nèi)外重要學(xué)術(shù)期刊發(fā)表論文30余篇。入選福建省百千萬人才工程、福建省“雛鷹計(jì)劃”青年拔尖人才、福建省引進(jìn)高層次人才、廈門大學(xué)南強(qiáng)青年拔尖人才。獲得廈門大學(xué)青年教師教學(xué)技能比賽一等獎和福建省社會科學(xué)優(yōu)秀成果二等獎、洪銀興經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎等多項(xiàng)教學(xué)科研獎勵。
【內(nèi)容摘要】
Using a proprietary bank-loan-level dataset, we find a surprising negative relation between loan spreads and minimum wage. We propose a stylized model to explain the relation: banks filter out the low-quality borrowers after the wage shocks, resulting in a separating equilibrium. Our evidence is consistent with the model’s predictions: (1) city-level and firm-level evidence shows that an increase in minimum wage is negatively associated with the likelihood of obtaining bank loans, especially for labor-intensive borrowers, (2) deal-level evidence shows that both the average default rate and loan spreads decrease when minimum wage rises, and (3) subsequently, labor intensive firms that are still able to obtain bank loans when minimum wage rises outperform their peers. Our findings suggest that as more credit resources are allocated to better quality firms and leave other firms far more behind, the existence of such credit reallocation effects can exacerbate the divergence between higher and lower quality firms induced by an increase in minimum wages.
【主持人簡介】
徐壽福，上海對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)金融管理學(xué)院副教授，博士（后），碩士生導(dǎo)師，美國南加州大學(xué)訪問學(xué)者，主要從事（行為）公司金融與資本市場等領(lǐng)域的教學(xué)與研究工作。
