報告人：Philip H. Dybvig
時 間：2022年6月17日上午10:00
方 式：騰訊會議線上研討會
會議號：419 367 914
會議密碼：261399
【報告人簡介】
Philip H．Dybvig，現(xiàn)為美國華盛頓大學(xué)圣路易斯分校奧林商學(xué)院金融學(xué)教授。于1979年獲耶魯大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位，曾任教于普林斯頓大學(xué)，并在耶魯大學(xué)獲終身教授職務(wù)。Dybvig教授在銀行理論、公司金融和資產(chǎn)定價等諸多領(lǐng)域均取得卓越成就，在Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Financial Studies等學(xué)術(shù)期刊上發(fā)表了系列高質(zhì)量論文，其中，尤具影響力的是其1983年發(fā)表于JPE的Bank Runs,Deposit Insurance,and Liquidity一文及該文所構(gòu)建的Diamond-Dybvig（DD）模型。
Dybvig教授曾擔(dān)任Review of Financial Studies，Journal of Finance，Journal of Financial Intermediation等期刊的主編和副主編職務(wù)，并于2010-2021年間受聘西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)金融研究院院長。任職期間，相繼獲教育部長江學(xué)者講座教授、中國政府 “友誼獎”和成都市政府“友誼獎”等榮譽稱號。
【內(nèi)容摘要】
Myers (1977) described how firms can gamble using asset substitution, which is switching to a less efficient and more volatile project. Gambling using derivatives is a sharper instrument, allowing the firm to gamble just to what is needed, and with negligible efficiency loss. We study gambling using derivatives, made more available by recent changes in the bankruptcy law granting repos and other derivatives “superpriority,” which is exemption from the automatic stay and clawback in bankruptcy. In our model, “gambling for redemption” operates at small scale and is socially beneficial, while “gambling for ripoff” operates at large scale and is socially inefficient but benefits stockholders at the expense of bondholders. Superpriority laws reduce firm value by making it harder for firms to borrow due to anticipation of gambling for ripoff.
【主持人簡介】
方紅艷，上海對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)金融管理學(xué)院副教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，金融學(xué)博士。2021年榮獲“四川省金融學(xué)會十九次金融科研優(yōu)秀成果一等獎”。
