報告信息
物流管理系2019年10月Workshop
主持人：楊曉東 博士 上海對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)國際經(jīng)貿(mào)學(xué)院物流管理系
時 間：2019年10月12日（星期六）9:00-11:00
地 點：上海對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)信息樓336室
主 辦：上海對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)國際經(jīng)貿(mào)學(xué)院物流管理系
主題
Partial Centralization in Competing Supply Chains
(競爭供應(yīng)鏈中的局部中心化)
主講人：施春明 教授 加拿大羅瑞爾大學(xué)商業(yè)與經(jīng)濟學(xué)院
主講人簡介
施春明教授2007年在Washington State University獲得博士學(xué)位，同年進入Wilfrid Laurier University任教，研究的主要領(lǐng)域是供應(yīng)鏈管理，可持續(xù)性，運營與會計交叉研究。他的研究成果發(fā)表在European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of the Operational Research Society, International Journal of Production Economics, Omega, and IEEE Transactions on System, Man and Cybernetics等知名國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊上。
報告簡介
A great amount of research has been done on whether a supply chain should be complete centralized or complete decentralized. With a completely centralized supply chain, a manufacturer can sell directly to the consumers or fully own the downstream retailer. With a completely decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer and the downstream retailer make decisions to optimize their own interests. However, complete centralization or complete decentralization may be inconsistent with the common business practice of partial centralization (PC) among firms. That is, a firm may own only a part of another firm within the same supply chain. In this paper, we make an important contribution by studying PC in two competing supply chains each with a manufacturer and a retailer. Our analyses and results show that for the competing manufacturers and their supply chains, PC can always lead to higher profits than complete centralization regardless of the level of product substitutability. Furthermore, PC can lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and their supply chains than complete decentralization except when competing are close to perfect substitutes. Therefore, this research offers an important explanation of the widespread business phenomenon of partial centralization in supply chains.
主題2
Carrot or Stick? An Analysis of Environmental Policies in Supply Chains
(“胡蘿卜”還是“大棒”？供應(yīng)鏈環(huán)境政策分析)
主講人：卞俊松教授 澳大利亞悉尼麥格理大學(xué)麥格理商學(xué)院
主講人簡介
卞俊松博士于2013 年獲得香港城市大學(xué)和中國科技大學(xué)管理科學(xué)博士學(xué)位。他是澳大利亞悉尼麥格理大學(xué)麥格理商學(xué)院的終身教授。在擔(dān)任現(xiàn)職之前，卞博士曾在澳大利亞皇家墨爾本理工大學(xué)、加拿大威爾弗里德·勞瑞爾大學(xué)和溫莎大學(xué)工作。他的研究興趣包括運營和供應(yīng)鏈管理、定量營銷和產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟學(xué)。通過使用各種研究方法，如博弈論和統(tǒng)計學(xué)，他的研究成果發(fā)表在《運輸研究E：物流和運輸評論》、《國際生產(chǎn)經(jīng)濟學(xué)雜志》和《運營研究年鑒》等期刊上。
報告簡介
This study investigates the impact of two environmental policies: emissions abatement subsidy and emissions tax, on a three-tier supply chain where the manufacturer distributes through competitive retailers and invests in emissions abatement manufacturing technology. The government pursues social welfare maximization, while the manufacturer and retailers are profit driven. We find that the subsidy policy offers the manufacturer greater incentives to abate pollution and yields higher profits for channel members; however, when emissions abatement is very costly and production emissions are highly damaging, the tax policy should be implemented, as the subsidy policy leads to lower social welfare and environmental performance. Interestingly, we show that the manufacturer has no incentive to improve emissions abatement efficiency if the environmental damage of its production is high under the subsidy policy or low under the tax policy. The manufacturer always welcomes more downstream entry under the subsidy policy but not necessarily under the tax policy; each retailer always fares worse with more competition. More competition enhances social welfare under the tax policy but not necessarily under the subsidy policy. Furthermore, caution should be exercised when adopting the subsidy policy, because a “hazard zone” exists where society suffers but does not under the tax policy.