報告信息：
主 題：Stable matching: An integer programming approach
主講人：黃超 博士
報告內(nèi)容摘要：This paper develops an integer programming approach on two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious continuum market induced from the original matching market. Each stable integral matching of the continuum market corresponds to a stable matching of the original matching market. We show that a stable matching exists in the original matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition. Our result indicates that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist with various forms of complementary preferences.
主持人：焦振華 教授
時 間：2021年5月14日（星期五）13：30-15:00
地 點：上海對外經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué)博識樓113會議室
主講人簡介：
黃超，上海財經(jīng)大學(xué)西方經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士，南京審計大學(xué)社會與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院潤澤學(xué)者，主要研究領(lǐng)域為：微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)理論、市場設(shè)計理論、匹配理論；論文發(fā)表于Games and Economic Behavior，Social Choice and Welfare等。
This paper develops an integer programming approach on two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a real-life market when firms’ preference profile satisfies a unimodularity condition. Contrary to common blief, this result indicates that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist with various forms of complementary preferences.