主要研究領(lǐng)域：博弈論、市場設(shè)計(jì)、微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)理論。

主持在研或完成國家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目、浙江省自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目、中國博士后基金面上一等資助項(xiàng)目、特別資助項(xiàng)目各一項(xiàng)。

主要論文：

1. When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?（with Ziyang Shen and Guoqiang Tian), Social Choice and Welfare, 2021.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01357-4

2. School choice with priority-based affirmative action: A responsive solution(with Ziyang Shen), Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021, 92: 1-9.

3. On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms(with Yajing Chen), Operations Research Letters, 2021, 49(3):300-303.

4. Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand(with Yajing Chen, Yang Zhang and Fang Zhao), Economics Letters, 2021,  202, no:109814.

5. Responsive affirmative action in school choice: A comparison study (with Guoqiang Tian)，Economics Letters,2019,181(1):140-146.

6. Affirmative action under common school priorities: The top trading cycles mechanism case (with Ziyang Shen and Guoqiang Tian), Operations Research Letters,2019,47(3):190-196.

7. Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice (with Guoqiang Tian), Economics Letters,2018,166: 60–62.

8. The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (with Guoqiang Tian), Games and Economic Behavior,2017,102: 44-55.

9. The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (with Guoqiang Tian, Songqing Chen and Fei Yang), Mathematical Social Sciences,2016,82:65-71.

10. The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (with Guoqiang Tian), Economics Letters, 2015, 129:52-56.